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LABOR LAW-OBJECTIVES TEST FOR DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF LABOR AcTIVITIEs-Labor's sanction, its most potent and at
times most devastating economic weapon, is its power to strike. 1 Indeed, a history of the labor movement could very properly emphasize
labor's untiring efforts to transform this naked power to strike into an
inherent juristic right, blessed with all the sanctity usually accorded
civil liberties in our democratic society. The transformation effort,
however, has been a turbulent one, with quite as much determination
on the part of those who wished to prevent any such transition as
there has been on the part of labor to achieve the result. In this
struggle the scope of lawful labor activity has been primarily deter-

1

See 15 TEX L.

REV,

344 (1937) for similar statement.
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mined by the economic conditions, popular sentiments and judicial
temperament prevailing from time to time.2
Beginning with the proposition that "all confederacies whatsoever
... are highly criminal at common 1aw" 3 and relying upon a succession
of statutes severely restricting the rights of laborers both individually
and in combination, the English courts early adopted the criminal
conspiracy doctrine as a means of punishing any form of concerted
labor activity.4 So deeply ingrained was the English law on this point
that it required parliamentary action to dispel it. American courts,
while they never wholeheartedly adopted the criminal conspiracy
doctrine from England, did nevertheless rely upon the same rationale
in affording the civil remedies of injunction and suit for damages. The
arsenal of judicial remedies thus placed at the disposal of the employer
provided more than an adequate defense to labor's most potent weapon,
the strike. In time this earlier position gave way to a somewhat more
liberal doctrine. Instead of holding that all concerted labor activity
was unlawful, the courts adopted the vague test that only a combination
organized to achieve an unlau1ful objective, or to achieve a lawful
objective by unlawful means was subject to judicial sanctions. This
so-called "objectives test" was utilized in proceedings for injunctive
relief against labor and if either the purpose or t]:ie means employed to
achieve that purpose were found to be unlawful, relief was afforded.
During the early development of this theory, almost any labor
objective or activity that would in any way prejudice the employer
was declared unlawful.- Gradually, however, the courts evolved a
more enlightened classification based upon the theory that while intentional harm done to the employer by labor activity was tortious, the
injury might be justified by the social interest served by securing certain benefits to labor. Thus, the courts began to weigh the harm done
against the benefit attained, not only with respect to the labor groups
affected but also with respect to the entire community. 5 This approach
2 Thomas, "Supreme Court-Organized Labor vs. Capital," 1 OHIO ST. L. J. 102
(1935); Fraenkel, "Judicial Interpretation of Labor Law," 6 UNiv. CHI. L. REv.
577 (1939); Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J.
195 (1938); FRANKFURTER and GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); LIEN,
LABOR LAW AND RELATIONS (19-38).
3 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 6th ed., c. 72, § 2, p. 348 (1789). See
Sayre, "Criminal Conspiracy," 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922).
4 See LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW 1-38 (1929) (historical introduction). For
an attempt to reconcile the conflicting views expressed by the above writers as to the
criminal conspiracy doctrine, see I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING,§ 28 (1940).
5 For a classic statement of this view, see Justice Holmes' opinion in Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). Cf. Spilman, "Labor and the Law,"
44 W. VA. L. Q. 87 (1938).
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was in no small measure induced by the philosophy prevalent in the
last century allowing free competition between various economic
groups of nearly equal bargaining power.
Until quite recently, labor's right to picket the employers' premises
was entirely dependent upon the legality of the strike in connection
with which the picketing was employed. The majority of the American
decisions have consistently denied the existence of an independent right
to picket divorced from a lawful strike.6 Thus, there has been almost a
complete parallel between the standards of lawfulness applied to strikes
and those applied to pickets.
It is the purpose of this paper to make a survey of the status of the
objectives test as a method of determining the legality of labor activity
before the Supreme Court rendered its momentous decisions in Thornhill v. Alabama,1 American Federation of Labor v. Swing,8 and the
Meadowmoor case.0 Thereafter the state decisions will be examined to
determine the effect of these rec~nt Supreme Court cases on the objectives test.
I.

Early State Cases

Prior to the decisions just mentioned~ the courts in this country had
shown considerable diversity of opinion as to what constituted a lawful
purpose for labor activity. The discord in this respect is ·by no means
surprising when we consider that the vague character of the objectives
test left to the individual conscience of the judge almost complete
freedom to interpose his own views upon the highly controversial issues
involved. It can safely be said, however, that certain objectives were
generally held to be lawful, at least from the beginning of the present
century; namely, increased wages,1° shorter hours,11 and better working
conditions.12 As to other objectives, the courts have been hopelessly
divided.
One of the most disputed and troublesome problems in the field of
labor law concerns the question of the closed shop. Is it a lawful objec6 l TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,

§

l l

7 ( 1940).

310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
8 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
9 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287,
61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
10 Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, 287 Pa. 171, 134 A. 430 (1927);
Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); New Jersey Painting
Co. v. Local No. 26, 95 N. J. Eq. 108, 122 A. 622 (1923).
11 Carter v. Oster, 134 Mo. App. 146, l 12 S. W. 995 (1908); Truax v. Bisbee
Local No. 380, 19Ariz. 379, 171 P. 121 (1918).
12 Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfg. Assn., 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643
(1915).
7
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tive? 18 In 1927 the statement was made that the view of the majority
of the courts in the United States was decidedly opposed to the legality
of strikes for such a purpose.14 In 1940, however, a leading treatise
ventured the opinion that this statement no longer has the support of
the cases. "Of the twenty-five states which have most directly passed
upon the question, fourteen favor such a strike, while eleven are opposed." 15 The basic, factual situations in which the closed shop dispute
arises fall into three fairly definite categories:
I. Where the employees strike to secure for themselves the
adoption of the principles of the closed shop.
2. Where the employees aided by the union strike to obtain
the institution of a closed shop agreement.
3. Where the union having no connection with the employees
calls a strike to force the employer to adopt a closed shop agreement.16

Tho~e courts which flatly denied the right to strike or picket in
any event for the purpose of achieving the closed shop did so relying
heavily on the theory that no labor objective beyond the immediate
and direct improvement of wages, hours, and working conditions was
legitimate.11 In a famous dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes reached
a contrary result and foreshadowed what was later to become the prevailing view, saying,
"· .. The immediate object and motive [the achievement
of the closed shop-] was to strengthen the defendants' society as a
preliminary and means to enable it to make a better fight on questions of wages or other matters of clashing interests. . . . I think
that unity of organization is necessary to make the contest of labor
effectual. . . ." 18
Between the older view which declared that the closed shop was
an illegitimate labor objective and Justice· Holmes' view that social
welfare and free economic competition justify labor welfare for that
13 "A closed shop, as popularly understood in the United States, is a place of employment where none but union members may work." Leiserson, "Closed Shop and
Open Shop," 3 ENcYc. Soc. ScI. 568 (1930). See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) 252 F. 722, reversed on other grounds 254 U. S. 443,
41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
'
14 OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS, § 292 (1927).
15 l TELLER, LABoR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 273 (1940), citing
jurisdictions.
16 15 TEX. L. REV. 344 ·at 350 (1937).
17 Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (19II); Miller v. Fish Workers' Union, 170 Misc. 713, II N. Y. S. (2d) 278 (1939).
18 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 at 505, 57 N. E. IOII (1900).
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purpose, the courts have reached a variety of results often based upon
refined distinctions provided by different fact situations. For example,
labor activity to coerce a closed shop agreement for one plant, or only a
few plants out of an entire industry, has been held permissible.19 On
the other hand, pressure to force a closed shop agreement upon an entire industry, where the effect of such an agreement would be to give
the union an effective monopoly over the labor market, has been held
illegal as a restraint on trade. 20 Another distinction has depended upon
whether or not the union seeking to eqforGe the making of a closed shop
agreement had a reasonable admission policy for outsiders.21 Again,
labor pressure for the closed shop has been held unlawful when directed against a small businessman employing but a few workers. 22
Sometimes courts have declared that coercion to obtain a closed shop is
unlawful where the union has no members in the employer's hire.23
The result in some of the last group of cases has been determined, according to the courts, by the terms of a state anti-injunction statute requiring the existence of a labor dispute as a condition precedent for its
application. The courts defined a "labor dispute" as existing only
where there was a direct clash of interests between the employer and
his workers. 24
Similar inconsistencies have been found in other fields of labor law.
For example, striking or picketing in violation of a nonstrike provision
in a collective bargaining agreement has generally been held illegal.25
However, a strike to enforce a legal collective bargaining agreement
19
Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316(1911). See 1 TELLER, LAlloR
D1sPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,§ 98, p. 279 (1940). Cf. Shinsky v. O'Neil,
232 Mass. 99, 121 N. E. 790 (1919).
2
° Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A. 600 (1913); R & W Hat Shop v.
Scully, 98 Conn. 1, II8 A. 55 (1922); Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151
N. E. 808 (1925).
21
Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 A.
720 (1938); Wills v. Local 106, Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio N. P.
(N. S.) 435 (1927); Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886
(1939); Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505
(1893). See 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT,§§ 788, 810 (1939).
22
Dolan Dining Co. v. Cooks' & Assistants' Union, 124 N. J. Eq. 584, 4 A. (2d)
5 (1938); Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, II N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1939), reversed 259 App. Div. 520, 19N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (1940).
23
l TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES -AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, §§ 97, 98, 99
(1940).
24
2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 274 et seq.
( 1940). See also Gallenson and Spector, "The New York Labor-Injunction Statutes
and the Courts," 42 CoL. L. REV. 51 at 56 et seq. (1942), for the views expressed by
the New York court, which seems to have vacillated considerably on this question. Problems arising under the Wisconsin Labor Peace Act will be discussed infra.
25
l TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 86 ( l 940).
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has been generally held legal,26 and where the strike is designed to enforce a closed shop agreement, the legality of the strike depends upon
the legality of the agreement. But in Massachusetts it has been held
that a closed shop agreement is legal, while a strike to secure a closed
shop agreement has been held illegal.21 A strike to induce the breach
of a yellow dog contract, however, was held illegal.28
On the question of what is a labor dispute, courts proceeding under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act have, in some cases, reached results decidedly inconsistent with results reached under the Wagner Act and similar state statutes. The typical fact situation is this: a majority union is
certified by the Labor Relations Board, making it an unfair labor prac-·
tice for the employer to bargain with the minority union; nevertheless,
the minority union pickets the employer to attain bargaining rights.
Faced with this perplexing situation, a New York court held that there
was a labor dispute and therefore the picketing could not validly be enjoined in spite of the fact that certification by a state or federal board
would thereby be rendered impotent.29 A Washington court on the
other hand held to the contrary and granted an injunction.80
The courts have likewise varied in their respective· conclusions as to
the legality of strikes called for the following purposes: in protest
against the discharge of fellow employees,31 against the use of laborsaving devices,82 to secure the employment of additional workers, 33 to
procure the discharge of an employee,84 to compel the use of a union
label,35 to enforce a fine or penalty,36 to compel payment of stale
Id., § 87.
Id. §§ 97, 170.
28 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65 (1917).
29 Stalban v. Friedman, 259 App. Div. 520, 19 N. Y. S. {2d) 978 (1940), reversing 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1939).
30 Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of America, 4
Wash. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940); Pando v. Bartenders' International Alliance,
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1940) 2 CCH LABOR CASES 359, 1f 18,543.
31 Proper: Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 186
N. Y. S. 95 (1921). Improper: Edelman, Edelman & Berrie v. Retail Grocery & Dairy
Clerks' Union, 119 Misc. 618, 198 N. Y. S. 17 (1922); Mechanics' Foundry & Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 N. E. 877 (1920).
82 Upheld in Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 108
N. ]. Eq. 297, 154 A. 759 (1931). Contra, Benito Rovira Co. v. Yampolsky, (N. Y. S.
Ct. 1921) 187 N. Y. S. 894 (1921).
33 Held legal in Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Assn.,
118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092 (1912); Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont.
183, 163 P. 107 (1917). Illegal in Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269,
126 N. E. 479 (1920).
84 I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 90 ( I 940).
3514., § 92.
30 Icl., § 93.
26

27
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claims. 87 The purpose of reviewing these decisions here is to indicate
that, while the courts have agreed in applying the objectives test in the
past, they have differed widely in their results.

The Supreme Court "Free Speech" Decisions
The year I 940 gave promise of heralding a new era in the turbulent development of American labor jurisprudence. In that year, the
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Murphy struck down an
Alabama statute, directed against all picketing, as a substantial impairment of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 88 Shortly
thereafter, in the Swing case,3° Justice Frankfurter, again identifying
peaceful picketing with freedom of speech, denied the right of a state
court to restrain such picketing in the absence of an existing employment relationship. These cases, revolutionary as they may be in the
field of labor law, are in complete harmony with the recent trend of the
Supreme Court to protect civil liberties even to the detriment of conflicting property rights. 40 By investing the right to picket peacefully
with a penumbra of federal constitutional protection, the Supreme
Court apparently embarked upon a policy designed to withdraw from
consideration by state courts the question of the legality of labor objectives in cases where peaceful picketing is employed. This process,
however, seems to be no more than a logical culmination of a legislative
trend directed toward depriving all courts of their power to balance the
conflicting interests involved in labor disputes.41 While the state courts
are thus precluded from questioning the legality of purpose involved
in picketing, they are presumably permitted to regulate the methods
employed by determining in each case whether the particular acts constitute peaceful picketing.
The Supreme Court, subsequent to its opinion in the Swing case,
handed down two decisions which seemed at the time to indicate a final
rejection of the objectives test for determining the legality of picketing
in labor controversies. The first of these decisions was the Wohl case
( upon first rehearing) .42 Here the plaintiff, a "peddler" who purchased bread from bakeries and in turn sold it to retailers, was warned
by the defendant union that unless he either joined the union or hired
2.

Id., § 95.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
39 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
40 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct.
954 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939).
41 See the Norris La Guardia Act, and similar state laws.
42 Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 313 U. S. 572, 61
S. Ct. 960 (1941).
s1
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a union driver one day a week for relief work they would picket his
business. The plaintiff did all of his own work, laboring about seventy
hours a week and earning approximately $3 5. After plaintiff's continued
refusal to comply with its demands, the union began picketing both the
retail stores which purchased from the plaintiff and the bakeries whose
products he distributed. The New Yark Supreme. Court granted an injunction, ostensibly upon the ground that -there was no labor dispute
within the purview of the state anti-injunction statute.48 The Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion.44 After denying certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States later granted a rehearing, assumed
jurisdiction and reversed the New York court in a three-line opinion
citing the Swing case. 45
In Journeymen Tailors Union v. Miller's, Inc., 46 the second of
these two cases, a tailor who never employed more than one worker
had entered into a closed shop contract with the defendant union.
When· the contract expired, the plaintiff made a new contract with a
rival union and, upon discharging his sole employee, hired one from
the successor union. The defendant picketed the store and claimed to
be on strike. The New Jersey court granted an injunction saying that,
_since there was neither a valid legal grievance nor a real labor dispute,
the doctrine expressed in the Thornhill case was inapplicable.47 The
Supreme Court, however, in another three-line per curiam decision reversed the state court, relying upon its prior decisions in the Thornhill
and the Swing cases.
The fact that in both of these decisions the highest state courts
found the union objectives unlawful and enjoined the activity seems to
indicate that they were not yet prepared to follow any literal application of the freedom of speech aspects of picketing. On the other hand,
the summary manner in which the Supreme Court reversed the state
tribunals, without considering it necessary to examine the question of
the legality of objectives, seemed to indicate that it was determined to
carry the Thornhill doctrine to its logical conclusion.
After the decisions in the last cited cases were rendered, the substantive law in respect to peaceful picketing seemed to be settled to the
satisfaction of the Supreme Court, when, to the consternation of both
bench and bar, the Court, acting on its own motion, granted a second
48 Wohl v. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Union, 259 App. Div. 868, 19
N. Y. S. (2d) 8II (1940).
44 284 N. Y. 788, 3·1 N. E. (2d) 765 (1941).
45 313 U.S. 548, 61 S. Ct. 1108 (1941).
46 312 U.S. 658, 61 S. Ct. 732 (1941).
47 Miller's, Inc. v. Journeyman· Tailors Union, 128 N. J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d)
824 (1940).
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rehearing in the Wohl case.48 In its second opinion, the Supreme Court
pointed out that its prior decision had been based upon the assumption
that the controversy in the trial court centered about the issue as to
whether a labor dispute was involved within the meaning of the New
York statutes and intimated that if, as a later New York court held, the
Wohl case had been decided on the theory that the picketing was for an
unlawful purpose, then the injunction would have been sustained. The
significance of this inference and its bearing upon the question whether
the objectives test is still applicable in determining the legality of labor
activity is manifest. It would amount to a categorical approval of the
objectives test, regardkss of the fact that the Thornhill and Swing cases
virtually eliminate such considerations.
Serious doubt might have been cast upon the validity of this implication, if the Supreme Court had not on the same day that theW ohl
case was decided sustained an injunction directed against similar picketing in Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local No. 2x3 v. Ritter's Cafe. 49
The Texas court in the Ritter case had enjoined the defendant union's
activity on the ground that the purpose involved was unlawful, but,
after Supreme Court's decisions in the Thornhill and Swing cases,
it granted a rehearing and sustained its prior decision, this time on the
ground that the union activity contravened the state antitrust laws. In
view of the fact that this statutory objection had not been raised until
the case came up on rehearing, the decision appeared to be no more than
a technical evasion of the freedom of speech doctrine. The Supreme
Court, however, sustained the injunction, saying that it was perfectly
permissible for a state to confine peaceful picketing to an area within
the economic context of the real labor dispute.
It is difficult at present properly to evaluate the import of these
decisions. If they represent a weakening of the protection previously
afforded peaceful picketing as a civil liberty, the Supreme Court has
certainly been evasive in saying as much in explicit language. It is
possible, therefore, that the decisions merely stand for the proposition
that picketing, like other civil liberties, is not absolute and must be
exercised in conjunction with other rights equally as desirable. However, since numerous articles by leading authorities have thoroughly
discussed the interpretation to be given these cases, we do not propose
to reconsider the question here. 50 Let it suffice to say that the authorities
48 Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 314 U. S. 704, 62
S. Ct. II8 (1941), opinion handed down in 315 U.S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 81.6 (1942).
49 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1942).
50 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd,
"Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARV. L. REv, 513 (1942); Teller,
"Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1942). See also 40

II52
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are not agreed as to whether the Supreme Court is retreating from its
position in the Thornhill and Swing cases or merely bringing picketing
under the same limitations imposed upon the exercise of other civil
liberties.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to treat the lawfulness of
means employed in labor controversies, it is important to point out the
significance of the Meadow-moor case 51 and its relation to the problem
of the lawfulness of ends or objectives. The question predominant in
the Meadowmoor case was whether a state can validly authorize its
courts to enjoin peaceful picketing when it is inseparably enmeshed
with contemporaneous acts of violence which are themselves admittedly
unlawful. With only one dissenting voice, the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, saying:
" .•. The Fourteenth Amendment still leaves the state
ample discretion in dealing with manifestations of force in the
settlement of industrial conflicts. And in exercising its power a
state is not to be treated as though the technicalities of the laws of
agency were written into the Constitution. . . . We find nothing
in the Fourteenth Amendment that prevents a state if it so chooses
from placing confidence in a chancellor's decree and compels it to
rely exclusively on a policeman's club." 52
By recognizing this limitation upon the constitutional right to
picket, the Court has done no more than place picketing in line with
other civil liberties. Freedom of speech and press are not absolute, but
must be exercised in conjunction with other rights equally as desirable.
It is manifest, therefore, that unlawful means may vitiate a concededly
lawful objective. Time and space, however, will not permit a further
consideration of this problem here. Suffice it to say that the controversy
over means has been even more pronounced than the controversy over
lawfulness of objectives.
We now intend to evaluate the impact of these Supreme Court decisions on the state courts.

3. State Cases after the "Free Speech" Decisions
(a) Picketing for a Closed Shop
As pointed out earlier in this comment, the issue of a closed shop
has been one of the most vexing and complex problems in the field of
labor law. Even prior to the recent "free speech" decisions, however,
M1cH. L. REv. 1200 (1942); 28 lowA L. REv. 151 (1942); 37 ILL. L. REv. 86
(1942); 21 CHI-KENT L. REv. 112 (1942); Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme
Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1037, supra.
51 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S.
287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
52 ld., 312 U.S. at 295.
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there were definite indicia of a judicial trend toward recognition of the
right to picket for a closed shop as such. According to statistics supplied by the Twentieth Century Fund Research,5 3 in I 941 one-third of
all employees in the ten leading industries worked under closed union
shop contracts. Out of the fourteen states which were said to have outlawed the closed shop, twelve of these have declared it legal within the
last four years and only two jurisdictions reveal recent decisions holding adversely to the legality of the closed shop. The Indiana Supreme
Court declared the closed shop unlawful as being contrary to the state
anti-injunction law 54 and the Florida court found it unlawful without
relying on any statute,55 but in view of the fact that both of these decisions were rendered before the recent free speech cases, their value as
precedent appears to be somewhat dubious at present. Students of the
subject have suggested that the trend toward the legality of the closed
shop is due to three main factors: (I) the enactment of state labor
legislation similar to the Wagner Act; (2) the liberalization of judicial
attitudes; (3) the impact of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions.
There can be little doubt but that the present war emergency will
have a profound influence upon this trend. Just how far and in what
direction this influence will deflect its course, however, remains somewhat obscure. Significant, perhaps, of the future treatment of the
closed shop issue is the unanimous decision of the National War Labor
Board, handed down on February 2 I, I 942, in the case of Phelps
Dodge Corporation v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter
Workers.5 6 In that decision the War Labor Board held that the question of "additional union security," namely, the union shop, should be
deferred to later negotiations between the parties,-negotiations which
might be undertaken when and in the event that an authoritative national policy is enunciated respecting the matter. The closed shop
demand was denied, the board stressed, because the interest of the
country in copper production during the present emergency is paramount to other considerations of labor policy.
While it appears that picketing for a dosed shop, without more,
is permissible, there may be other factors present which will induce
the court to enjoin this activity. For example, in Schwab v. Moving
Picture Machine Operators Local No. x59,5 1 the union picketed the
plaintiff's theater for the purpose of obtaining a closed shop contract,
As quoted in 9 L. R.R. 300 (1941).
Roth v. Local Union No. 1460, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939).
55 Retail Clerks Union Local 779 v. Lerner Shops, 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529
(1939).
56 IO L. R. R. 33 (1942).
57 165 Ore. 603, 109 P. (2d) 600 (1941).
53

54
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one of the provisions of which called for the discharge of the plaintiff's
employees and their replacement with union members.· The Oregon
court, which granted an injunction, said that the Thornhill case was not
controlling in this situation since it does not apply where there is a
"concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose." (Is this not a
statement of the old conspiracy formula?) Nevertheless, it seems to be
established that an outside union, wishing to obtain closed shop, may
lawfully picket and disseminate advertisements to the employer's customers urging them to take their patronage elsewhere.58 In Kentucky,
for instance, the courts had consistently held to the contrary on this
point, but recently reversed their position under the authority of the
Swing case.59
•
The recent history of the New Jersey courts on the closed shop
issue is extremely illuminating. As late as 1940 they had certified the
following prerequisites for determining the legality of picketing for
the closed shop: (a) there must be a strike in the employer's plant; or
(b) if there is no strike, then the picketing must have a certain measure
of success in injuring the employer's business (if the picketing is unsuccessful in this respect, it will be enjoined as serving no purpose); ( c)
the closed shop, if attained, must not lead to a labor monopoly over the
entire industry.00 Subsequently the highest court of New Jersey
brushed away these limitations and refused ta grant an injunction even
in the absence of the above prerequisites. In this decision the court did
not inquire into the legality of the purposes of the picketing, evidently
deeming it unnecessary to consider the question. 01 In another recent
case, not involving the issue of picketing, however, the New Jersey
court expressly held a closed shop contract to be valid even though it
resulted in a labor monopoly in an entire industry. 62
·
Although it is much too early to predict with assurance what the
future has in store for the closed shop issue, it appears likely that the .
courts will entertain a more liberal attitude towards it in the future than

a

158 Heine's, Inc. v. Truckdrivers' & Helpers' Union, 127 N. J. Eq. 514, 14 A.
(2d) 262 (1940).
59 Blanford v. Press Pub. Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941).
60 Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 127
N. J. Eq. 564, 14 A. (2d) 46 (1940); Blonder v. United Retail Employees of Newark, 128 N. J. Eq. 41, 15 A. (2d) 826 (1940), reversed in 129 N. J. Eq. 424, 19 A.
(2d) 786 (1941), on the authority of Feller v. Local 144, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 421, 19 A. (2d) 784 (1941).
81 Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 129
N. J. Eq. 368, 19 A. (2d) 659 (1941); Feller v. Local 144, International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 421, 19 A. (2d) 784 (1941). Both of these
cases relied upon the Swing case.
82 F. F. East Co. v. United Oystermen's Union, 128 N. J. Eq. 27, 15 A. (2d)
129 (1941).
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they have in the past. A few of the old limitations have already been
discarded to make way for changing industrial conditions and there is
nothing, except perhaps the exigencies of war, to indicate. a reversal
of this trend.

(b) Picketing by a Minority Union Pending Certification
Can a minority union picket to achieve bargaining rights with the
employer where the petition for certification is pending before tlie state
or federal labor board?
'
Two recent state court decisions have answered the above question
in the affirmative, both relying upon the doctrine expressed in American Federation of Labor v. Swing. In the first of these cases,63 the majority union, including some 878 members out of the total r200 employees, petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for certification
as the appropriate bargaining unit. The defendant union, consisting of
only twelve members, picketed the employer in order to obtain independent bargaining representation. The Washington court, three
judges dissenting, denied an injunction against the picketing by the
defendant on the ground that a certification had not as yet been issued
by the Labor Board. In a concurring opinion, one judge went beyond
the immediate question involved to express the opinion that even in the
event that there had been a certification of the majority, peaceful picketing by the minority could not validly be enjoined without impairing the
defendant's constitutional guarantee of free speech. Furthermore, the
judge said, any legislative enactment which prevents picketing by a
minority group merely because a majority union has already been certified by the board would be equally unconstitutional. The position
taken by the court here would seem to be contrary to the prevailing law
in Washington as it was previously expressed in the Bloedel case. 04
A somewhat analogous situation arose in S. & W. Fine Foods v.
Retail Delivery Drivers & Salesmen's Union. 65 Here the defendant
63
Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Everett District Council, 1 I ~ash. (2d) 503,
19 P. (2d) 643 (1941).
6
~ Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International V/oodworkers of America, 4
Wash. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940). See also Montgomery Ward Employees'
Assn. v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., (D. C. Cal. 1941) 38 F. Supp.
321, citing the Swing case.
65
II Wash. (2d) 262, II8 P. (2d) 962 (1941). In Milano Importing Co. v.
Retail Sales People's Union, (Conn. Ct. Com. Pl. 1941) 5 CCH LABOR CASES, U
60,845, plaintiff's employees voluntarily organized a company union and made a collective bargaining agreement with their employer. Defendant, an affiliated union, picketed
the employer to compel him to sign a contract with them. Held, that such picketing
was unlawful and could be enjoined; although the Senn case was quoted, nothing was
said about the Thornhill, Swing, etc., decisions. Cf. also lsolatite, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, 130 N. J. Eq. 506, 22 A. (2d) 796 (1941); Euclid
Candy Co. of California v. International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, 49
Cal. App. (2d) 137, 121 P. (2d) 91 (1941).
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union, although it had no members in the plaintiff's employment,
nevertheless picketed the plaintiff's establishment in an attempt to in, duce its salesmen to join the union. An election held by the National
Labor Relations Board indicated that the plaintiff's salesmen were
unanimously opposed to any union affiliation. The defendant, however,
continued to picket, bringing the plaintiff's business close to :financial
ruin because the suppliers of essential services refused to cross the picket
line. While recognizing the obvious injustice of the situation, the court
felt .itself bound to apply the doctrines established by the Swing and
Wohl cases, and therefore denied injunctive relief.
Similar, results have been reached in other jurisdictions. For example, in Montgomery Ward Employees' Assn v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn.,6 6 the court said:
" . . . To bestow upon plaintiff organization these requested
powers [to secure injunction] would sanction it as a bargaining
agency, possessed of the right 'to prevent picketing, prior to the
determination of the Board as to which organization does repre,sent the employees. . . . The National Labor Relations Act does
not permit courts to establish rights prior to the determination of
the National Labor Relations Board."

(c) Picketing by a Minority Union After Certification
of Majority Union
Can a minority union lawfully picket where the National Labor
Relations Board or similarly constituted state boards have certified the
majority union?
.
As indicated in the preceding section, recent decisions have generally refused injunctive relief in cases where a petition for certification
is still pending before a labor board. The same unanimity among the ·
courts is lacking, however, in cases where the minority picketing occurs
after the board has certified a majority union as the appropriate bargaining unit. For example, in Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe
Salesmen's Union, 61 the employer negotiated a contract with a majority
union already certified by the New York Labor Relations Board following the usual election. The defendant unions totally disregarded
the board's action and continued to picket the plaintiff's establishment.
Nevertheless, the court denied an injunction on the ground that there
was a real labor dispute within the purview of the state anti-injunction
statute, but the court neglected entirely the issue of freedom of speech
and made no reference to the recent Supreme Court decisions. It did,
(D. C. Cal. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 321 at 322-323.
288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. (2d) 480 (1942). Compare, Montgomery Ward
Employees' Assn. v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., (D. C. Cal. 1941) 38
F. Supp. 321.
66
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however, express extreme reluctance in denying the injunction and felt
that such denial would seriously hamstring the efforts of the state labor
board to achieve industrial peace. On the other hand, in a recent Massachusetts case,08 a similar set of facts produced a diametrically opposite
conclusion when the court granted an injunction, saying that the union
was attempting to achieve an unlawful purpose. The Thornhill and
Swing cases presented no obstacle to relief here, the court said, since in
neither of those decisions were the objectives of the union in contravention to state law. These cases lend authoritative substance to the belief
that the status of the law on this point is in an even more chaotic condition today than it was before the Supreme Court handed down its
recent decisions.
Several factors have contributed to the divergence of results reached
under this section as compared with the general concurrence of results
in the preceding section. In the first place, the public policy involved
here requires that the authority of the labor boards should not be frustrated by arbitrary picketing after the board has already finally determined which union constitutes the appropriate bargaining unit. There
is no such policy present before the board has acted. Secondly, it is
manifest that the objectives here are illegal since the picketing is designed to compel the employer to do that which is regarded as an
unfair labor practice, namely bargaining with a minority union.
Thirdly, there is a definite tendency on the part of the courts to apply
the free speech theory of picketing scrupulously when the results thereby achieved are in accord with prior precedent in their jurisdiction and
to ignore that theory completely when the results will conflict with
previous decisions. Even before the recent Supreme Court cases, state
courts were inclined to deny an injunction in situations where the
picketing occurred prior to certification. 69 Therefore, an application of
the freedom of speech theory in such cases could be made without altering the practical effect of previously existing law. But, since the general
rule in earlier cases was to grant an injunction where the picketing occurred after certification had been issued, 70 any application of the freedom of speech theory here almost always conflicted with prior decisions.
The fact that some courts were and others were not willing to sacrifice
prior authority and follow the logical implications of the Thornhill and
Swing cases accounts for part of the diversity found in this section.
68

R.H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 51·0, 38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1942).
Fur Workers Union No. 21238 v. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72, 308
U.S. 522, 60 S. Ct. 78 (1939); Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) 96
F. (2d) 450.
70
Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, (D. C. Mo. 1937) 21 F. Supp.
20; Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of America, 4 Wash.
(2d) 62, IO P. (2d) 270 (1940).
69
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(d) Picketing to Induce Breach of Contract
Can a union peacefully picket to induce the employer to breach his
contract with another union or with a third person?
The recent state court decisions on this question seem to indicate
that the mere fact that the picketing tends to induce a breach of contract
is not enough to justify an injunction. For instance, a California Superior Court decision 7~ held that picketing by an affiliated union in
furtherance of a strike to force an employer to enter into a closed shop
agreement, even where the employer already operated und~r a closed
shop agreement with ,another union, is a lawful exercise of freedom of
speech. The court felt that it was entirely immaterial that the defendant's conduct tended to induce a breach of contract. The case does not,
however, stand for the broad proposition that the objectives test is no
longer applicable in California since the court considers at length
whether the objective is a legitimate one. 12 Under this view, the same
result could have been reached without reference to the freedom of
speech doctrine. In Lyons v. United Hotel Employees,13 the defendant
union picketed the plaintiff's hotel in an attempt to vitiate a contract
between the plaintiff and his employees which the union considered to
be adverse to the labor standards existing in the whole industry. It
was held that the picketing could not be enjoined since it was a lawful
exercise of freedom of speech. The court pointed out that the defendant
union had a very substantial interest in the controversy and that it was
immaterial whether the plaintiff's contract was actually unfair since the
court was not concerned with the wisdom of the defendant's views.
In De Wilde v. Scranton Building Trades Council,14 a similar result was achieved when an employer, previously under contract with an
A. F. of L. union and while negotiating wage rates under that contract,
suddenly and without notice made a contract with C.1.0. union at lower
wage rates. The court refused to enjoin the defendant's picketing, saying that the plaintiff could not, by merely concluding a contract with a
rival union under these circumstances, terminate what was in other
respects a bona fide labor dispute under the Pennsylvania anti-injunction statute and thereby protect himself in his refusal to bargain with
the defendant union. Nothing was said about freedom of speech, however, and none of the recent Supreme Court cases were cited.
In Davis v. Y ates,1 5 the contract involved differed from those previn Los Angeles County Fair Assn. v. Pomona Valley Central Labor Council, (Cal.
Super. 1941) 4 CCH LABOR CASEs, fl 60,626.
72 Cf. J. Rabinowitz & Sons v. Devery, (N. Y. S. Ct. 194,2) 9 L. R.R. 680 (not
officially reported) .
,
·
73 (Cal. Super. 1941) 9 L. R. R. 45.
1: 343 Pa. 224, 22 A. (2d) 897 (1941).
75 218 Ind. 364, 32 N. E. (2d) 86 (1941).
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ously mentioned in that it was negotiated between an employer and a
third party, whereby the employer leased his mine to certain nonunion
workers who undertook the operation of the mine and in consideration
agreed to pay the employer a fl.at price per ton of coal and then divide
the profits among themselves. This ingenious contract was apparently
devised in order to avoid the necessity of complying with union demands and union wage scales. The defendant union picketed the mine
to force the owner to abandon this method of operation and hire union
labor in accordance with the union wage scale. An injunction was refused on the authority of the Swing case and without reference to the
breach of contract features involved.
While the cases in this section have achieved harmonious conclusions, it will be seen that the legal means employed to rationalize these
conclusions have differed widely. Some courts have apparently adopted
the free speech analysis, others continue to investigate objectives, and a
few have invoked their state anti-injunction statutes as a means of explaining their results. The danger inherent in so varied a repertoire of
legal justifications was realized in the Ritter's Cafe case. 76 In this case,
a restaurant owner entered into an agreement with an independent contractor for the erection of a building some distance from the plaintiff's
establishment. The defendant, a building trades union, picketed the
plaintiff's restaurant to compel him to insert a provision in the contract
requiring the contractor to employ union labor. The Texas court first
granted the injunction on the ground that the defendant's objective
was illegal as tending to induce the plaintiff to breach his contract.
Subsequent to this first decision, the Supreme Court decided the Swing
and Meadowmoor cases so the state court granted a rehearing. On rehearing the previous injunction was sustained on the ground that even
under the Swing case a court can still enjoin picketing which violates a
state statute ( the court found defendant's conduct to be in violation of
the Texas antitrust laws). Apparently the only effect of the Swing
case on the Texas court was to cause it to shift its decision from one
ground to another in sustaining the injunction. The effect of the
Meadowmoor decision, said the judge, is to allow the state courts to
enjoin picketing involving such conduct as the state is authorized to
declare unlawful, or picketing which involves the breach of such laws as
are deemed necessary for the proper protection of the inhabitants of the
state. It came somewhat as a surprise to both bench and bar when the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld this injunction and declared it perfectly proper for a state to draw a line "in confining the
area of restricted industrial warfare" so as to "localize industrial con76 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, (Tex. Civ.
App: 1941) 149 S; W. (2d) 694.
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:flict by prohibiting the exertion of concerted pressure directed at the
business, wholly outside the economic context of the real dispute." 77
It would appear that the Supreme Court is now willing to sanction refined evasions of the logical implications of the Thornhill and Swing
cases. Undoubtedly, the instant decision leaves a sizable loophole for
the imposition by the state courts of their own individual conclusions.

( e) Picketing in Violation of State Statutes
As indicated in the Ritter's Cafe case,78 the Texas Supreme Court
has recently made a successful attempt to restrict the application of the
principles of the Swing case by characterizing picketing as a violation of
the state antitrust laws and therefore outside the scope of constitutional
protection. In a later case, the same court again granted an injunction
on the ground that, since the union activity constituted a secondary
boycott, it too was contrary to the state antitrust laws.79 By sustaining
the line of reasoning exemplified by these decisions, the Supreme Court
has imposed a severe limitation upon the constitutional right theory.
Indeed, it is difficult to-predict the extent to which encroachments upon
that theory may now be justified by merely alluding to some state enactment which has been violated in the course of a labor conflict.
An indication of what may be expected to result from this approach
is found in Petrucci v. fl ogan.80 Here, the city of New York had taken
over the New York rapid transit system, which had been previously
operated under a closed shop contract with the defendant union. The
city immediately proceeded to incorporate all its employees under the
state civil service law pursuant to the state constitution. The defendant
union picketed the homes of the employees to force them to rejoin the
defendant union; apparently for the ultimate purpose of obtaining
a closed shop contract with the city. The court granted the injunction
because, it said, a closed shop would violate the civil service law, which
regulates the terms of employment of city employees, and would also
be repugnant to the state constitution. The union purpose, therefore,
was designated as "unlawful," but nothing was said about freedom of
speech.81
·
77 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722 at 726, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1942).
78 Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 694.
79 Borden Co. v. Local 133 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) 152 S. W. (2d) 828.
80 (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718.
81 Cf. Board of Trustees of Public Affairs of Village of Celina, (Ohio Com. Pl.
1941) 9 L. R. R. 527, holding that employees of a municipally owned utility have a
right to picket for the purpose of obtaining an increase in wages. There was no civil
service law applicable.
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Similar results were reached in two recent cases involving the question whether protection under the state anti-injunction acts should be
extended to associations of small independent merchants who were
accused of violating the state and federal anti-trust laws. A union of
news dealers 82 and an association of independent fishermen 83 were held
not to be bona fide unions of employees within the meaning of the antiinjunction statutes and consequently injunctions against them were
granted.
.
The decisions in these cases give further indication that the courts,
even the Supreme Court, are not as yet willing to prosecute the freedom of speech doctrine to its logical conclusion. When the recent free
speech cases were decided, there was nothing to lead us to suppose that
picketing was to be treated differently from any other method of disseminating information. But these cases show clearly that when freedom of speech takes the form of a picket line different treatment will
be accorded than in cases where it is exercised through the usual media
of press and radio.

(f) Picketing Business Owner Who Hires No Outside Help
Has a union a right to picket to compel an employer who runs his
business without any help to hire union members or to join the union
himself?
Prior to the recent free speech decisions, the law had not been
settled in regard to picketing directed against a man who does his own
work and operates his business without outside help. In Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 84 the Supreme Court said that it was. not
satisfied that there was any constitutional prohibition against such
picketing and refused to issue an injunction. Since the state courts were
not in complete accord with this view, many of their decisions either
failed or refused to take notice of the Senn case when the situation was
repeated. Almost every case, however, decided since the Swing decision has refused to enjoin such activity. 85
A common feature of this situation is the pitting of a powerful union
against a comparatively weak individual. This was the problem pre82
83

People v. Masiello, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 512.
Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Assn., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 117 F. (2d)

310.
84

301 U.S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857 (1937).
Feinberg v. Pappas, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 5; Comen v. Osman,
(N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 353; Rubin v. Choina, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941)
26 N. Y. S. (2d) 10; Neckritz v. Goldberg, (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 9 L. R.R. 243 (not
officially reported); Fromer v. Winokur, ( N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 37 N. Y. S. (2d) IO.
None of these was decided on the free speech issue. In O'Neil v. Building Service
Employees International Union, 9 Wash. (2d) 507, II5 P. (2d) 662 (1941), free
speech was the issue. Also in Friedman v. Blumberg, (Pa. Super. 1941) 21 A. (2d) 41
(withdrawn by order of court).
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sented in the Wohl case, mentioned above, 86 and the New York Court
of Appeals granted an injunction against the union but was reversed by
the United States Supreme Court. The Washington court faced a like
situation when the defendant union picketed an apartment building
which plaintiff operated by herself, for the purpose of inducing her to
join the union. The court denied the injunction on the authority of the
Swing case, and said that it was immaterial that the plaintiff had no employees.87 Three judges dissented on the ground that tht! Swing case
did not compel them to go.that far. Subsequent to this decision and to
the Wohl case, a Washington judge in the S. & W. Fine Foods case 88
said that it was now clear that there was no basis for the.dissent in the
above case in view of the iater United States Supreme Court decision in
the Wohl case, which involved the same fact situation, i.e. an employer
operating without employees.
,
In 2063 Lawrence A venue Building Corporation v. Van H eck,89
an apartment house owner who employed only- one employee was
picketed by the defendant union in an attempt to ·organize that employee. The court refused to enjoin the union's picketing for this purpose on the authority of the Swing case and pointed out ~hat the only
inquiry necessary in these cases is to determine whether or not there
was any violence. One Washington judge bitterly commented on
these decisions:

"In the short period of less than one year we have been swiftly
and steadily led away from the fundamental principles upon
which our government was founded to a point where we now
judicially ignore a fundamental 'inalienable' right which it was
instituted to secure; for, during that brief period, it has been made
manifest that the law will no longer protect the right of our citizens to freely work, acquire property, and engage in the pursuit
of happiness, whether they attempt to exercise that right by the
method of working for hire or, as Hyman Wohl ... elected to do
by ·striving for themselves and their respective families singlehanded and alone." 90
86

Supra, at note 42,

87 O'Neil v. Building Service Employees Union, 9 Wash. (2d) 507, II5 P. (2d)
662 (1941).
88 S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union, II Wash.
(2d) 262, 118 P. (2d, 1941), discussed supra at note 65.
89 377 Ill. 37, 35 N. E. (2d) 373 (1941).
90 S. & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers & Salesmen's Union, l l Wash.
(2d) 262, l l 8 P. (2d, 1941 ), dis1;ussed supra at note 65. '
where partners conducted a business without employees, a New York county court
granted an injunction on the findings that there was no employment relation and the
pickets were noisy and threatening. Smith v. Citizens Federation of Labor, (N. Y. S.
Ct. 1942) 9 L. R. R. 56 (not officially reported).
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(g) Is There a Constitutional Right to Strike?

In Kingston Trap Rock Company v. International Union of Operating Engineers,91 the plaintiff employer claimed that the conduct of
the defendant striking union was enjoinable as constituting a secondary
boycott. The union had attempted to induce the plaintiff's customers
to refrain from using the plaintiff's products by ordering union members not to work on the installation of any of these products. The
court, aft:er deciding that the objective of the union, i.e. to obtain a
closed shop, was legitimate, pointed out that labor has a right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to work or not as it sees fit. Any laborer can
refuse his services for any reason, good or bad, and laborers can combine together for this purpose without violating the law. The court
quoted the following language of the Swing case: "The right of free
communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers,
in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ,"
and then continued, "This freedom of action respecting one's own labor
is no less sacred than the right of communication." This language at its
face value seems to contain the germ of a new constitutional right, the
right to strike. In spite of this broad dictum, however, the actual holding is no more revolutionary than the earlier New York cases of
Bossert v. Dhuy 92 and Goldfinger v. Feintuch. 93
•
The question has of late been raised in connection with recently proposed federal antistrike legislation whether or not Congress can constitutionally deprive labor of the right to strike. More specifically the
question can be put, is the right to strike endowed with the same constitutional protection that is now accorded the right to picket peacefully? An argument can be made for the proposition that the individual
has the right to cease work at his will by virtue of the involuntary servitude provision of the Thirteenth Amendment and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, different considerations enter into the picture where we have concerted activity by a union
in calling a strike. In the first place, the common-law conspiracy doctrine made concerted action unlawful where the same action might be
lawful for the individual. Justice Brandeis, recognizing this, said:
"Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers
the absolute right to strike. . .. a strike may be illegal because of its
purpose, however orderly the manner in which it is conducted." 84 It
would seem that there is much more justification for applying the conspiracy analysis to the right to strike than to the right to picket peaceu.9 N. J. Eq. 570 at 580, 19 A. (2d) 661 (1941).
22.1 N. Y. 342, II7 N. E. 582 (1917).
93 276 N. Y. 281, II N. E. (2d) 910 (1938).
94 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 at 3II, 47 S. Ct. 86 (1926).
91
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fully. Picketing conducted by one individual alone can conceivably be
unlawful and tortious, whereas the only element in peaceful striking
which can properly be regarded as unlawful is the concert of activity
because, as we have seen, an individual has the right to cease working
at his own will. Practical difficulties of enforcement arise from the fact
that constitutionally the courts can only enjoin officials of a union from
inducing the members to strike and the members from planning a
strike with one another.
As pointed out at the outset of this paper, originally the mere combination to strike, without regard to the legality of the objectives or
the means employed, was held to be illegal. Gradually, however, this
strict rule gave way to the doctrine that the legality of the objectives
and the means used to attain those objectives constituted the final test,
the combination not being illegal per se. This_ seems to be the status
of the right to strike at· present, but the question remains unsettled
whether the Supreme Court . will want to extend this right along
parallel lines with the right to picket peacefully.
The foregoing analysis would seem to indicate that the recent effort of the Supreme Court to elevate peaceful picketing to the status of
a civil liberty has not produced the results expected when the doctrine
was first expressed in the Thornhill case. Some state courts have completely ignored the Supreme Court mandate, while others, although
recognizing the constitutional right, have restricted its application to
exclude situations (a) where the picketing is directed toward an unlawful purpose, (b) where it violates a state statute, and ( c) where it
is accompanied by violence. The few jurisdictions which have submitted to the new principle have done so with a good deal of reluctance and misgiving. There should be no occasion for astonishment,
therefore, that the Supreme Court itself, faced with this imposing
array of dissenting voices, both from the bench and in leading legal
periodicals, has already begun to retreat from its position originally
adopted in the Thornhill and succeeding cases. 95 What new developments are imminent, however; remains a perplexing problem, difficult
if not impossible of solution ~t present. In any event, we can say with
assurance that the objectives test for determining the legality of labor
activity is still a potent factor with which to be reckoned.
Arthur B. Lathrop
95 For arguments pro and con on this point, see Teller, "Picketing •and Free
Speech," 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 532 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A
Dissent," 56 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1943).

